A Structural Model for Early Exit of Older Men in Belgium by Lefebvre, Mathieu & Orsini, Kristian
 1 










European Commission, Brussels, Belgium 
e-mail: kristian.orsini@ec.europa.eu 
Abstract 
In this paper we propose a structural model of the retirement decision for older workers in Belgium. We model 
the exit paths available through the various available schemes. Our framework allows exploiting all information 
on possible exit paths and also better identifying preferences and constraints. Results based upon Belgian 
microsimulation data from 2001 for private sector workers fits rather well observed behavior. Simulations of 
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In this paper, we develop a structural model of the retirement decision in Belgium. 
The last decades have shown a substantial decline in labor force participation of 
older workers in OECD countries but Belgium has been experiencing this trend 
most severely than others. The labor force participation of men aged 60-64 fell 
from 61% in 1970 to 20% in 2003 while that of men aged 55-59 fell from 82% to 
54%. 
Previous studies by Pestieau and Stijns (1999) and Dellis et al. (2004) have 
stressed the role of the social security system in inducing early retirement in 
Belgium. Since the early 1970's, a large variety of exit schemes have been put in 
place. The standard retirement path requiring workers to be at least 60 years old 
has been paralleled by an early retirement scheme for workers aged 58 and over1 
and by a derogation to standard requirements for old-age unemployment, assuring 
a smooth transition from unemployment to retirement (the so called "Canada-dry" 
system2). 
The aim of this paper is to propose a structural model of the labor supply of older 
workers in Belgium. The analysis is based on a dynamic discrete choice model, 
which includes individual heterogeneity in the deterministic part of the utility. In 
essence our model is similar to the option value model by Stock and Wise (1990). 
In the option value model, a worker chooses the state that has the highest value by 
comparing the expected discounted value of the income they will receive until the 
end of life under different strategies.  
However in several respects, our modeling strategy extends the option value 
approach. The intertemporal budget constraint is fully modeled, thus exploiting all 
the available information. Observed individual or family characteristics are 
incorporated through one or more of the coefficients of the utility function. We 
also exploit all information on possible exit paths and our framework allows better 
identifying preferences and constraints. The model recovers the parameters of the 
structural preferences of the population. Finally one advantage of this modeling is 
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 This is the statutory age specified in the law but many departures from this, authorizing an exit 
even earlier are possible within the framework of sector-level collective agreements. 
2
 This alludes to an old European commercial for Canada Dry ginger ale which was said to have 
the color of beer without actually being beer. 
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that it is much more practical than the dynamic programming rule developed to 
implement the dynamic choice of labor supply3. 
We estimate the model for Belgium by using a unique dataset for the year 2001 
derived from the microsimulation model MIMOSIS; a static simulation model 
based on administrative information. The microsimulation model allows the 
reconstruction of the individual intertemporal budget constraint of wage-earners. 
Difficulties are encountered in modeling the building up of social security wealth 
for civil servants and the self employed. We therefore focus on the behavior of 
wage-earners. As stressed in Coile and Gruber (2007), retirement decisions are a 
function of both pension incentives and wages, with wages being the source of 
most of the variation between individuals. If wage differences between 
individuals partly capture heterogeneity in tastes for work, however, then building 
wage variation into the retirement incentive measure can lead to misleading 
estimates of the responsiveness to financial incentives. The use of our much richer 
data source will avoid this problem, by controlling comprehensively for past 
earnings and individual household characteristics. 
In the following section we detail the various pathways to retirement for wage-
earners in Belgium. The model is presented in Section 3. Data, sample selection 
and prior-estimation computations are described in Section 4. Parameter estimates 
are presented in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, simulations of illustrative 
changes in the social security system are presented. Section 7 concludes.  
2. Institutional features 
The Belgian retirement system is characterized by three very unequal pillars4. 
First comes the wage-earners' retirement scheme which represents the largest 
proportion of pension income for the vast majority of individuals. The second 
pillar consists of company pension plans, which only play a minor role as a source 
of income for the average worker. In the private sector they are confined to the 
higher-income individuals. The third pillar is made up of individual retirement 
savings, which take the form of individual-pension savings account, life insurance 
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 See Berkovec and Stern (1991), Rust (1989) and Rust and Phelan (1997) for dynamic 
programming models of retirement behavior. A major inconvenient of the dynamic programming 
models is that they are computationally intensive. 
4
 A good review of the various Belgian social security schemes can be found in Dellis et al. 
(2004). 
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and so forth. In this paper we focus exclusively on the first pillar. Private 
programs are very small in size and they account for a much lower share of the 
retiree’s income. Whereas the first pillar represents pension entitlements of more 
than 250 % of GDP, assets in private-pension funds only amount to 10% of GDP. 
Alongside the wage-earners' retirement scheme, several other pathways into 
retirement have progressively evolved. They operate under the name of 
conventional early retirement schemes or alternatively as a form of old-age 
unemployment. We will review these three schemes. 
2.1. The Wage-Earners’ Retirement Scheme 
This is the standard retirement scheme. It allows voluntary retirement from age 
60, with a normal retirement age fixed at 65. The choice of retirement age does 
not imply any actuarial adjustment. However the choice of retirement age is not 
completely neutral with respect to the benefit amount, because a full earnings 
history consists of forty-five years of work for men, a condition that many people 
do not satisfy at the age of 60. For those having more than forty-five working 
years, a dropout-year provision operates, replacing low-income years with higher 
ones. Benefits (B) are computed according to the formula:  
kw
N
nB **=  
where n represents the number of years of affiliation with the scheme, N the 
number of years required for a full career, and k is a replacement rate, which takes 
the value of 0.6 or 0.75 depending on whether the individual claims benefits as a 
single person or as a household. w  is the indexed average wage over the period of 
affiliation. A peculiar feature of the system is that periods of one’s life spent on 
replacement income (such as unemployment or disability benefits) fully count as 
years worked in the computation of the average wage, and hence of the social 
security benefits. For any such periods, fictive wages are inserted into the average 
wage computation. Imputed wages are set equal in real terms to those the worker 
earned before entering these replacement income programs. Finally benefits are 
shielded against inflation through an automatic consumer price index adjustment 
and are subject to an earnings test. Currently the earnings limit is approximately 
€7,422 per year. For earnings above this limit, pension entitlement is suspended.  
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A guaranteed minimum pension income is fully paid out of general government 
revenue and it is means-tested. This pension is only available after the normal 
retirement age of 65. 
2.2. The Conventional early Retirement Scheme 
There is a whole arsenal of early retirement schemes that have been put in place 
over the last few decades. These schemes are gathered together under the title of 
Conventional Early Retirement (Prépension conventionelle). All of these 
arrangements are based on collective agreements, which are negotiated between 
employee and employer associations. Within such schemes, the workers exit the 
labor market and receive unemployment compensation and a bonus paid by the 
employer, which equals half the difference between the individual's last net wage 
and the unemployment benefit. The amount of unemployment benefit depends on 
the family status. If the individual is single or has a family which is dependent on 
her earnings, she is entitled to 60 per cent of the previous net wage. If the spouse 
or partner has income, she may claim only 55 per cent.  
Early retirement scheme implies that workers cannot draw social security benefits 
before the normal age of retirement of 65. But since according to Belgian social 
security provisions, days spent as unemployed (or sick) count as working days, 
the pension rights of the older unemployed are virtually unaffected. The minimum 
age of eligibility to conventional early retirement benefits is 58 but the worker 
must have worked for at least 25 years and must be able to prove a total of 624 
working days during the previous three years. However many departures from this 
statutory age, authorizing early retirement earlier are possible within the 
framework of sectoral-level collective agreement.  
2.3. Old-age unemployed exempted of job search 
The unemployed worker aged fifty or older can be considered as an "old-age 
unemployed" person (chômeurs âgés dispensés de recherches d'emploi) and is 
neither subject to control regarding availability to work, nor to benefit cuts due to 
long-term unemployment. Access to this status is conditional on the duration of 
the work career: at least 20 years. Moreover the older unemployed may receive a 
seniority supplement dependent on the family situation. Since the system is not 
experience-rated, this is a convenient way to exit with the agreement of employers 
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who want to get rid of older workers. That is the employers do not contribute to 
the financing of the benefit, so that the available public scheme is used as a means 
of subsidizing the reduction of the company's workforce.  
Table 1 gives an outline of the importance of the different schemes for the year 
2001 and summarizes the age and the conditions of eligibility for each one. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
3. The model 
Consider a worker who is allowed to exit the labor market within a discrete 
interval [t, T] where t starts at the current age. T corresponds to the time of normal 
retirement. This interval is then a function of the worker’s current age. At each 
time t within the interval, if still working, the individual has to choose between 
several alternatives within a set { }ucst RRRJE ,,,=  where J stands for working 
and Rs, Rc and Ru stands for retiring through the standard retirement schemes, the 
conventional early retirement scheme and the old-age unemployment scheme 
respectively. The alternative choice set is discretized, that is the individual must 
choose either to work during time t or to exit the labor market through one of the 
three possible exit paths. However, the number of opportunities varies between 
individuals and depends on the person's age and career history, factors which 
determine their eligibility for the various pathways to retirement. 
We assume that once the worker exits the labor market, the choice is irreversible. 
In theory it would be possible for an individual to reenter the labor market. In 
practice, however, this behavior is almost never observed. Also, we do not 
account for part-time retirement, which is very uncommon in Belgium and 
according to the law, once one of the exit schemes alternative to standard 
retirement is chosen, the individual cannot enter another scheme until he or she 
has reached the age of normal retirement which is 65. 
We ignore the possibility of saving and borrowing, so that individual's utility is 
derived from current income and from other variables dependent on the 
employment or non-employment status, such as the amount of leisure. Most 
retirement models in the literature assume that period-specific consumption is 
equal to period-specific income (e.g. Stock and Wise, 1990; Berkovec and Stern, 
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1991 and Colombino, 2003). A notable exception is Gustman and Steinmeier 
(1986) who assume perfect credit market. 
Define Vijt as the individual i's utility, from making at time t the choice j, where j 
represents the time and the path taken on the labor market ( tEj ∈ ). That is j 
represents the choice of one of the exit paths at some point in the individual's time 
horizon [t,T]. 
In particular the individual's utility corresponds to the sum of a deterministic part 
Uijt , and of a random term εijt. The structural part of the utility is a function of 
current income (Yijt) and leisure (Lijt), future income and leisure (Yijr, Lijr) up to the 
time of mandatory retirement ( tEr ∈∀ ), social security wealth at the time of the 
end of programming horizon (WT) and other individual and household 
characteristics (Zit)5. Social security wealth summarizes the whole time path of the 
social security annuities from the normal age of retirement (T) until the end of 
life. More formally we have: 







ijtijTWTirijrijrYrijt WUZYLUV ε      (1) 
We also assume that the utility derived from the different periods is the same, 




= ρ         (2) 
Therefore at time T, leisure is no longer marketable and the utility is only given by 
the value of WT. Note also that income and leisure flows are conditional on choice 
j. Yij denotes the individual's income after tax which may be in the form of wages 
or benefits. The benefits are those received by the individual if retired. The 
stochastic term may be interpretable as an optimization error, but more 
specifically it may be considered as taking into account the uncertainty of future 
events. 
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 We do not consider private savings and individual wealth since this information, required to 
estimate empirical model, is not available. However prior analysis shows that the effect of assets is 
small relative to social security wealth (Hausman and Wise, 1985). In addition there is evidence 
that a large majority of the elderly have very little wealth other than housing and social security 
benefits and that housing wealth is typically not consumed as the elderly age (Feinstein and 
McFadden, 1989). Samwick (1998) shows that financial assets have an insignificant effect on 
retirement, and housing net equity has a significant negative effect on retirement but small in 
magnitude. 
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In this intertemporal forward looking framework, at each time t, an individual 
chooses not only whether to keep working or to exit the labor market, but also the 
optimal exit path (i.e. the timing and the scheme for exiting the labor market). The 
individual compares the value of retiring now with the best of future possibilities. 
The decision rule is the following: an individual will continue to work if the 
expected value of retiring now (in each of the three exit paths) is lower than the 
value of taking at least one exit path in the future. 
Identification is conditional on the a-priori functional form of the structural utility 
term. In this respect we have chosen not to impose any restrictions on the 
estimation procedure. We simply assume a quadratic form in income and leisure 
and a quadratic function in social security wealth: 
YLLLYYLYU yllllyyyY ααααα ++++=
22),(     (3) 
2)( WWWU wwwW αα +=        (4) 
This specification has the advantage of being flexible and easy to estimate 
because it is linear in its parameters and can be used for the analysis of all sorts of 
linear or non linear benefits changes6. Finally the preferences vary between 
individuals through taste-shifters (such as age, marital status, size of the 
household,..) incorporated through the income and leisure parameters, and so we 
include a constant term: 
1
'
10 yyy X ααα +=    (5) 
1
'
20 lll X ααα +=  
where X1 and X2 are vectors containing taste-shifters. The probability that an 
individual exits is then easily obtained. The error terms εjt are i.i.d. across 
alternatives and individuals according to an EV-I distribution. The assumption that 
the error terms are i.i.d. limits the flexibility of the error structure, but is necessary 
to obtain simple expressions for the probabilities that one exit path be chosen. 
McFadden (1973) proves that the probability that alternative j is chosen by one 
individual at time t is given by: 
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 This specification has been widely applied in the labor supply empirical literature; see Blundel et 
al. (2000), Bargain and Orsini (2006) as well as Van Soest et al. (2002) who applied an even more 
general polynomial specification. 
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If we observe the individual at the beginning and at the end of a period, we may 
derive an expression for the probability of staying in employment Pwork at the end 
of the period, as well as the probability of exiting the labor market during the 
course of the period Pretire. Pretire will be the sum of the probabilities of choosing 
all possible exit paths such that the exit is after t+1.  
The probability of exiting Pretire by choosing a particular exit path j*  is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( )













































while the probability of working will be given by: 
retiretretireworkwork PErVVP −=∈∀≥= 1),Pr(      (8) 
Starting from this specification, note however that the intertemporal setting may 
lead to an explosion of alternatives to be evaluated, especially for workers with a 
wide time horizon. On the other hand, workers who are close to normal retirement 
age will only have a limited number of choices. This heterogeneity in the choice 
sets is easily accommodated by logit models, which do not rely on the 
homogeneity of the choice sets between individuals. What matters, however, is 
that the utility derived from the different options is evaluated in the same space (in 
this case, income, social security wealth and leisure). 
Note that the model is not very different from the option value approach (Stock 
and Wise, 1990), especially in its hazard model form, since it takes into account 
the income flows (and the discounted wealth) many years in advance. However in 
several respects, the proposed model extends the option value approach. In 
particular, the intertemporal budget constraint is fully modelled. For each discrete 
choice, the associated income is obtained by way of a microsimulation technique 
(see below) so that leisure-consumption preference can be estimated. The 
approach has the advantage to provide a straightforward way to account for 
nonlinear and nonconvex budget sets of a complex tax and benefit system when 
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modelling individual labor supply. Furthermore, the model proposed here is more 
structural than Stock and Wise, in the sense that it clearly separates preferences 
from constraints, thus allowing for extended analysis of reforms within the 
structure of incentives. 
Finally, basic option value model appears not to capture the data, in the sense that 
sharp increase in the retirement hazard at some specific age is underpredicted. The 
same problem was identified by Stock and Wise (1990) and Samwick (1998). A 
possible explanation is that there might be some fixed costs or social stigma 
associated with exit through one route or another or maybe this is the result of a 
customary retirement age effect that is not associated with particularly 
advantageous monetary gain. As discussed in Lumsdaine et al. (2001), this 
inability to predict the large spike could be corrected by including indicator 
variables for all age levels as explanatory variables. The predicted hazard rates 
would then trace out the mean retirement rates by age. The multinomial logit 
framework of our model allows for a much simpler ad hoc approach. We follow 
Van Soest (1995) and introduce alternative state specific dummies to capture 
these unobserved effects that maybe associated to each route of retirement. In 
particular we include one dummy for exit through the standard retirement scheme, 
one dummy for exit through the early retirement scheme and one dummy for exit 
through the old-age unemployment scheme. Equation (1) is then replaced by 








     (9) 
These additional dummies may be interpreted as fixed costs associated to one or 
another exit route. Dagsvik et al (2010) point that this interpretation is of a rather 
ad hoc nature since it clearly does not rest upon an explicit structural argument. 
However they show that this correction with alternative specific disutilities can be 
viewed as a reformulation of a model in which the number of outside 
opportunities is directly introduced in the structural part of the utility as. They 
hence offer some theoretical rationale for a structural interpretation of this 
practice. 
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4. Data and prior-estimation computation 
4.1. Sample selection 
The analysis relies on a sample of administrative data constructed in a two step 
sampling procedure. First a random sample of 100,000 individuals was sampled 
from the complete set of all individuals who, according to the National Register, 
are known to have their main place of residence in Belgium on January 1st 2002. 
Individuals in this random sample could be either living in private or collective 
households. In a second step, the sample was extended to include all the 
household members of those individuals drawn in the first step and living in 
private households. The final sample comprises a set of 305,019 individuals. 
Sample weights have been constructed to inflate the sample to the 2001 total 
population level and to correct for the over-representation of larger households 
caused by the sampling method. For this sample, a data set with micro data from 
various administrative sources was constructed. Apart from some household 
characteristics taken from the National Register (age, sex, relationship between 
household members, region of residence), the data set consisted of variables taken 
from the "Datawarehouse labor market and social protection". The data set we 
employ contains: (i) labor market income and a number of labor market 
characteristics for wage-earners in either the private or public sector; (ii) some 
labor market characteristics and incomes of the self-employed; and (iii) 
information on various social benefits, such as unemployment benefits, sickness, 
disability benefits and pensions. All variables in our data set contained 
registrations for the tax benefit year 2001. 
For the purpose of our study, we selected a subsample made up of men aged 
between 50 and 64 who were employed in the private sector in the first quarter of 
the year 20017. We thus excluded all other categories of workers than private 
sector wage-earners. We also excluded (pre)retired, sick and disabled individuals 
as well as part-time workers who are not fully available for the labor market. 
People with mixed labor status, e.g. a wage-earner with an additional self-
employed activity or an individual working a part of the quarter but receiving 
benefits for the rest, were removed. Finally we have also excluded some 
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 As explained above, the first possibility for exiting the labor market occurs at 50 years, while the 
mandatory retirement age is 65 
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individuals for which the data set contained missing observations. We are 
confident that this sampling is not particularly harming the analysis since the 
focus of the paper is on active wage-earners. 
Following the selection we are able to estimate a model based on 3176 men. The 
used sample appears greatly restricted compared to the initial data set. However 
this is not surprising since we concentrate the analysis on male workers and a lot 
of individuals in the considered age bracket are already out of the labour market. 
Indeed the initial sample contains 43891 individuals (male and female) aged 
between 50 and 64 and only 25% were active.  
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the modeled sample. The average age in 
the sample is 54 and the average annual wage of men is 25,743EUR. A majority 
of individuals are in couple and the average length of career is 35 years. Table 2 
also shows the transition from activity to inactivity during the year 2001, that is 
the people who were working during the first quarter but who where no longer 
working in the last quarter. A first observation is the correlation between age and 
the probability of exiting the labor market. Another important observation is the 
role of "pivotal" age. Indeed the ages of 58 and 60 appears to be crucial in the 
decision to exit the labor market. These correspond to the first ages of access to 
conventional early retirement and standard retirement respectively. 
[Table 2 about here ] 
4.2. Wage forecasts 
The modeling strategy relies on information on the full wage profile for all 
individuals up to the age of 65. So far, the data set contains the wage history of 
each individual in the sample, as recorded in the pension administration register, 
until the year 2001. This information was used to forecast the wages for the years 
to come and, as a consequence, the benefits individuals might claim upon 
retirement.  
There are numerous ways to go about predicting wages. The simplest method is to 
assume a real earnings growth. Coile and Gruber (2001) use a rate of one percent 
growth per annum for example. One can also use the previous wage observations 
to regress a wage model and get the coefficients to predict wage dynamics. This 
approach has the advantage of taking into account the effect of different sources 
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of heterogeneity, and is therefore preferred. In order to forecast wages, we used 
the observed earnings history for each individual in our sample and regressed the 
logarithm of the hourly wage of the individuals on the logarithm of the age and 
the logarithm of the age squared. Since the best predictor of this year's wage is last 
year's wage, we included the lagged wage rate. We also added dummies to control 
for the sector of activity given by NACE 2 digits, the occupational status, region 
of residence and marital status. Table 3 presents the wage forecasting equation. 
Wage forecasts were computed for all individuals up to the date of mandatory 
retirement using the coefficients of the regressions. 
[Table 3 about here ] 
4.3. Microsimulation models and benefits 
Using the information contained in our data set, we were able to simulate the 
benefits entitlements (and disposable income) of individuals if they chose one of 
the three exit paths. This was done using a microsimulation model. MIMOSIS is a 
microsimulation model for the Belgian social security and personal income tax 
system, running on the administrative dataset described above. Since the data go 
back to the tax benefit year 2001, the legislation that is currently modeled as 
baseline legislation is the one of 20018. 
For every age less than 65 in 2001, we simulated (up to the age of 65) the benefits 
the individuals were eligible for. Because of age, working history or occupational 
status, the individuals were not faced with the same opportunities. Using 
MIMOSIS, we obtained for each age to come the benefits individuals could claim 
if they continued to work until that age. 
As stated above, in order to take into account the stream of income individuals 
would receive after 65 we included the social security wealth (W). This is the 
present discounted value of all future benefit flows from a given social security 
scheme. Discounting was carried out allowing both for time preference and 
mortality adjustments. W was computed for every pathway towards retirement 
that the individual was eligible for. 
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 For further details on MIMOSIS see 
http://www.socialsecurity.fgov.be/fr/nieuws_publicaties/publicaties/mimosis/toepassingen.htm 
14 
The W at 65 for a particular exit path of a worker of age a in the case of retirement 
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where θ(s) is the survival probability at age s (conditional on being alive at age a), 
ρ is the rate of time discount, and Bh(s) is the pension benefit expected at age s if 
the worker retires at age h.  
Once we had obtained for each exit path the flow of net income (labor or pension 
income, net of social security contributions and personal income taxes, plus other 
benefits the household may be eligible for), we were able to derive, conditional on 
the observed behavior, the preference structure governing the retirement choice in 
the given institutional setting. 
5. Estimation results 
The model was estimated by maximum likelihood. The theoretical model requires 
additional assumptions in order to be estimated: 
(i) The total number of hours of leisure (Li) available per week is bounded 
to 80 and the actual number of hours is obtained by subtracting the 
hours actually worked. Once retired, whatever the scheme, the number 
of hours of leisure is 80. 
(ii) We assumed that each person is completely liquidity constrained. 
Benefits are treated as zero before the first eligibility age. This is not 
too far from the truth since virtually no one retires before some 
benefits are available.  
(iii) As discussed before, the eligibility age in the conventional early 
retirement scheme may differ among individuals according to sectoral-
level agreements. In our administrative dataset, we have this 
information for each worker. Hence eligibility age varies between 
workers. 
(iv) We introduced taste-shifters for income (X1) and leisure (X2). 
Preferences for leisure may vary between individuals according to sex, 
age, being in a couple and the region of residence. There is no a priori 
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reason for not incorporating household characteristics into the utility of 
income. However recent studies on the utility of income derived from 
psychophysical literature assume that income is only influenced by the 
size of the household9. 
(v)  Finally, we performed a sensitivity analysis with respect to time 
preference and we retained a discount rate (ρ) of 3%, which is common 
in the literature. 
In Table 4, we present the results. The parameters in the utility function by 
themselves are not very informative. However, in order to be theoretically 
consistent, the derivative with respect to income needs to be positive, which is the 
case. Concavity in income, in particular, is a required feature of the consistency of 
the model (Van Soest, 1995). The utility of wealth coming from a pension after 65 
also displays diminishing returns. These results show that the size of the 
household plays a positive role in the marginal utility of income. Being in a 
couple is insignificant. The age increases the marginal utility of leisure and thus 
increases the likelihood of retirement. Workers living in Flanders have higher 
utility from leisure. We note that the parameter associated with the interaction 
term between income and leisure is significantly different from zero and is 
negative. State dummies associated with the standard retirement, conventional 
early retirement and unemployment are all significant (continuing to work is the 
reference in this case). 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The results discussed so far seem satisfactory but we can also judge the prediction 
power of the model by comparing the observed and predicted probabilities of 
exiting the labor market. On average the model almost perfectly fits the data. The 
actual departure rate is 5.04% and the predicted departure rate is 5.46%. Figure 1 
shows the probabilities of exit by age. The model barely fits the exit peaks 
observed at 58 and 60. As discussed above, this finding is not new (see Stock and 
Wise,1990 and Samwick,1998). The model implies some persistence in individual 
preferences for working versus retirement. There may be an effect of the 
"customary retirement age" with these ages of eligibility. In addition, the model 
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 See Aaberge et al. (2004) and Dagsvik and Strom (2004). 
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predicts rather well the probability of exit at other ages but overpredicts retirement 
after 61. It is difficult to find a clear reason for this difference. We can argue that 
the conventional early retirement scheme is the result of a multitude of sectoral 
agreements that each propose different eligibility rules. We have used the sectoral 
eligibility ages for this scheme but eligibility may occur later. In this context, our 
estimates offer many more opportunities to workers in comparison with what they 
actually face. Finally, as shown in Figure 2, the predicted cumulative hazard rates 
appear to be very close to the actual ones so that the model predicts accurately the 
cumulative exit behavior. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
6. Reforms simulations 
Our model can be used to predict retirement behavior following a reform affecting 
the inter-temporal budget constraint. Such ex-ante analysis may give an insight 
into the potential impacts and serve as an evaluation tool to assess reforms aiming 
at increasing the employment rate of older people. To illustrate this, the effects of 
four alternative policy reforms are simulated: 
(i) Policy 1: the first reform consists of reintroducing the standard 
retirement scheme as it existed before 1991. Before that date, pensions 
taken anticipatively before 65, were penalized by a 5 % actuarial 
reduction of the benefits for each year of anticipation. Individuals 
taking their pension at 60, instead of 65, therefore received 75% 
(100% - 5x5%) of the benefit they would otherwise be entitled to.  
(ii) Policy 2: the second reform consists simply of an increase by 3 years 
of all key ages in the various schemes. After the reform, the first age of 
eligibility for claiming benefits in the standard retirement scheme is 
63, it is 61 in the conventional early retirement scheme and for access 
to unemployment exempted from job search, it is 53.  
(iii) Policy 3: the third reform consists of the so called "pension bonus". 
Following the Belgian Intergenerational Solidarity Pact of 2005, 
employees working beyond the age of 62 can benefit from a pension 
supplement. The "bonus" of 2 EUR per day worked beyond these 
17 
limits increases the annual benefit payable, and this occurs 
independently of the wage earned or the contributions accumulated.  
(iv) Policy 4: the last reform consists of a policy that would equalize early 
retirement schemes through a unique retirement age. From this reform, 
access to benefits is only possible at the age of 60 at the earliest, 
whatever the pathway. 
The simulations are based on the estimates of Table 4. The baseline hazard rates 
are the model predictions under the 2001 system illustrated in the previous 
section. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the hazard rates of departure and the cumulative 
distribution of departures under the different policies as compared to the baseline.  
Policy 1: The introduction of a 5% actuarial reduction of the benefits in the 
standard retirement system is expected to have a positive effect on labor supply 
between age 60 and 65. This reform should encourage additional work after age 
60 through an income effect. We see on Figure 3 that the reform has a small 
negative effect on departures before 59 and a larger effect after 60. However such 
a reduction in benefits seems not to be sufficient to induce individuals to totally 
revising their exit choice since the average retirement age is marginally changed, 
as shown on Table 5. The change in the financial incentives seems to produce 
little impact on labor supply of older men. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Policy 2: This corresponds to an increase by 3 years of all the ages of eligibility. 
The reform implies a drop in the departure rates. While the model predicts that 
almost 44% of those working at age 50 will leave before age 60, only 39% would 
have left if all eligibility ages had been increased by 3 years. We show on Figures 
A1, A2 and A3 in the appendix how this policy implies a drop in each exit path 
hazard rates before the new ages of eligibility. The exit rates through old-age 
unemployment fall largely before 53 and then increase faster than in the baseline. 
Before the age of 60, the exit rates of conventional early retirement are low. The 
fast increase in the exit rates at 57 vanishes and occurs now at 60. Finally the 
same kind of results applies for the standard retirement scheme where the peak 
occurs later. Interestingly, the effect of the reform on the effective age of 
retirement is much stronger than in the previous simulation. Here it is 58.6 years 
old. This reflects the longer wait before the retirement benefits can be claimed. 
18 
Policy 3: The introduction of the pension bonus after 62 has a small impact. 
Actually the pension bonus implies a higher social security wealth for every age 
of retirement after age 62. This should encourage additional work before age 62, 
but will reduce work among those already working past age 62 through an income 
effect. In Figures 3 and 4, the effect is similar to the effect of Policy 1 except after 
the age of 62. Interestingly, from 62 to 64, individuals use the standard retirement 
pathway (see Figure A 1) more often than they did before the reform. At the same 
time the number of retirees in the two other schemes decreases for these ages. The 
effect of the reform is a transfer of person from the early retirement scheme and 
the unemployment scheme to the standard retirement scheme. As a result, the 
average age of retirement does not change much. 
Policy 4: Finally, we consider the last reform which consists of one set retirement 
age at 60. The hazard rates drop considerably before the age of 60. Persons who 
are employed at 60 or older face the same options as before the reform. Looking 
at the cumulative distribution of departures, the model predicts that almost 44% of 
workers at age 50 will leave before the age of 60 under the baseline. Only 29% 
would leave if retirement had been at the age of 60 instead. This implies an 
increase in the effective retirement age to 59.3. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
[Figure 4 about here] 
These simulations are interesting on two points. First, social security certainly 
provides incentives for early retirement. But these incentives do not only result 
from a level of generosity in the amounts of benefits. The provision rules inherent 
in the social security systems are of great importance. Second, what emerge from 
these results is that there seems to be a real preference for retiring earlier in 
Belgium. Even if we reduce the generosity of provision, this has only a small 
impact on the behavior of workers. This is important at the time of reform of the 
systems. Only a mix of eligibility restriction with some reduction in financial 
incentives could achieve an increase in the labor force participation of older 
workers. 
Finally, the results may appear rather small but we have to keep in mind that an 
increase of the retirement age of just 6 months would mean the avoidance of 
thousands of monthly benefits needing to be paid by social security. In the era of 
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an aging population and problems of financial sustainability for the social security 
program, this is not negligible. Our framework with the help of the 
microsimulation MIMOSIS could also be applied to calculate the budgetary 
impact of these reforms but this is outside of the scope of this paper. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper develops a framework to model the retirement decisions of older 
workers. The model is forward looking and thus resembles the option value 
model. An individual compares the utility obtained under different choices of exit 
at different times. The proposed framework, however, extends the option value 
model in order to fully recover the structural preference parameters. We take into 
account the fact that the various paths to retirement preferences may vary between 
individuals through taste-shifters on income and leisure.  
Based on administrative data for Belgium and with the help of the 
microsimulation model MIMOSIS, we estimated the model parameters and used 
the estimation to assess four policy proposals for reforming the Belgian retirement 
system. Our simulations show that each reform might have an impact on 
retirement rates but with variable success. Reforms that modify the access to 
every retirement pathway have more potential effects on the probability of exit 
than those simply targeting the generosity of the standard retirement scheme. 
However, we also show that the last reform implemented by the Belgian 
government, the "pension bonus", does not seem to have the expected impact. On 
the contrary it could reduce the labor force participation before 65. 
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Number of people 155,921 114,930 182,653 453,504 
% 34% 25% 40% 100% 
     
Eligibility     
Age 50 58 60  
     
Career 20 years 25 years 
+ 624 days 
No restriction  
Source: Belgostat and National Office of Pensions 
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Table 2 : Sample statistics 
N 3176 
  
Household size 2.7 
Age 54 
Living in couple 90.5% 
Living in Wallonia 29.4% 
Living in Flanders 63.2% 
Yearly net wage (in€) 25,743 
Length of career (in years) 35 
  





































Table 3 : Wage forecasting equation Dependent variable : ln(wt) 
 Coefficient Std. Error 
ln(Age) -0.7401 0.0496 
ln(Age)2 0.1030 0.0071 
ln(wt-1) 0.9034 0.0012 
Region:   
Brussels Ref. Ref. 
Wallonia 0.0002 0.0017 
Flanders 0.0010 0.0008 
Marital status:   
Couple Ref. Ref. 
Single -0.0075 0.0014 
Occupational status:   
White collar Ref. Ref. 
Blue collar -0.0454 0.0010 
Activity sector dummies Yes  
Year dummies Yes  
   
















Table 4 : Parameters estimates 
  Coefficient Std. Error  
αy Constant 0.4075 0.0439 *** 
 Size 0.0111 0.0036 *** 
αyy  -0.0021 0.0002 *** 
αl Constant -0.0376 0.0874  
 Living in Flanders 0.0206 0.0111 * 
 Living in Wallonia 0.0166 0.0115  
 Couple 0.0067 0.0074  
 Age 0.0025 0.0009 *** 
     
αll  0.0009 0.0008  
αyl  -0.0048 0.0005 *** 
αw S.S.wealth 0.0010 0.0036  
αww S.S. wealth squared -0.0011 0.0001  
β Std. retirement -0.5301 0.0813 *** 
 Conv. ER -0.4933 0.0804 *** 
 Unemployment -0.5452 0.0794 *** 
     
 # observations 3176   
 Log-likelihood -639.244   
Note: The amount of income is divided by 1000 and the amount of S.S. wealth 
is divided by 10000. 
 
Table 5 : Average retirement age 
 Baseline Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 Policy 4 
Average 
retirement age 57.7 57.8 58.6 57.8 59.3 
 
